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INTRODUCTION 
American cities are on the march.  Many city populations have stabilized 
after a long decline, downtowns are thriving, and commentators celebrate the 
city resurgent.1  In addition, cities are flexing their policy-making muscle.  
Cities have been adopting ordinances in areas as diverse as environmental 
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 1. See generally ALAN EHRENHALT, THE GREAT INVERSION AND THE FUTURE OF THE 
AMERICAN CITY (Vintage Books, eds. 2012); Ingrid Gould Ellen & Katherine O’Regan, 
Reversal of Fortunes?  Lower-Income Urban Neighborhoods in the U.S. in the 1990s, 45 URB. 
STUD. 845, 866 (2008); Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, Urban Resurgence and the 
Consumer City, 43 URB. STUD. 1275 (2006); Michael Storper & Michael Manville, 
Behaviour, Preferences, and Cities: Urban Theory and Urban Resurgence, 43 URB. STUD. 
1247 (2006). 
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protection and health care and asserting themselves into policy spaces often 
considered exclusive to the state or the federal governments.2 
Despite this general shift in city fortunes, however, American cities 
continue to be weak in important ways.  Consider Detroit, which declared 
the largest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history after a state receiver was 
appointed to take over the city’s government. 3   Some Detroit residents 
protested the suspension of elective municipal government, but for most 
outsiders, neither the declaration of bankruptcy nor the appointment of a state 
receiver garnered much attention or outrage.4  Questions about the efficacy 
and justice of appointing unelected state officials to govern entire cities were 
only raised after the crisis in Flint, another Michigan city with an appointed 
state receiver.5  In Flint, public officials who had replaced the elected city 
government failed to respond to complaints about the city’s water supply, 
which was subsequently shown to be thoroughly contaminated. 6   The 
failures of Flint’s water supply revealed both the entrenched inequities in 
America’s basic infrastructure and the striking limits of the electoral, 
economic, and political power of residents living in struggling 
municipalities.7 
This lack of local political power is not restricted to municipalities in 
serious economic crisis.  After Charlotte, North Carolina adopted a 
transgender rights ordinance, the state legislature responded with sweeping 
legislation aimed at limiting the authority of local governments to regulate 
across a number of areas. 8   The North Carolina legislature objected to 
                                                                                                                                         
 2. See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1117-22 (2007). See 
also Scott L. Cummings & Steven A. Boutcher, Mobilizing Local Government for Low-Wage 
Workers, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 187, 189 (2009).  Examples include: Newark, N.J., Envtl. 
Just. & Cumulative Impact Ordinance (July 7, 2016); S.F., Cal., Admin. Code § 14.1(b)(6) 
(2008) (San Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance). 
 3. See Monica Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Billions in Debt, Detroit Tumbles into 
Insolvency, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/us/detroit-files-
for-bankruptcy.html [https://perma.cc/JT83-7HAG]. 
 4. See, e.g., Monica Davey, Bankruptcy Lawyer is Named to Manage an Ailing Detroit, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/15/us/gov-rick-snyder-kevyn-
orr-emergency-manager-detroit.html [https://perma.cc/58VA-VC6C]. 
 5. Richard Schragger, Flint Wasn’t Allowed Democracy, SLATE (Feb. 8, 2016), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/02/a_big_reason_for_t
he_flint_water_crisis_no_democracy_there.html [https://perma.cc/GAM9-PPVV]. 
 6. See Julie Bosman, Flint Water Crisis Inquiry Finds State Ignored Warning Signs, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/24/us/flint-water-crisis.html 
[https://perma.cc/TJP8-RWMH]. See also Schragger, supra note 5. 
 7. See generally Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 
1118, 1180-204 (2014); Michelle Wilde Anderson, Democratic Dissolution: Radical 
Experimentation in States Takeovers of Local Governments, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 577 
(2011). 
 8. See Dave Philipps, North Carolina Bans Local Anti-Discrimination Policies, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/24/us/north-carolina-to-limit-
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Charlotte’s law because it permitted transgender citizens to use bathrooms 
that conformed to their gender identity, as opposed to their biological sex.  
In a statute known popularly as HB2, the state not only overturned the 
“bathroom” portion of the city’s ordinance but also declared that wage and 
hours regulation, municipal contracting, employment discrimination, and 
public accommodations laws are all “properly . . . issue[s] of general, 
statewide concern, such that . . . [state statutes] supersede and preempt” any 
contrary local policy.9  Many American cities have adopted local LGBT anti-
discrimination ordinances, living wage laws, or other forms of social welfare 
regulation.10  And many cities have seen state legislatures preempt those 
ordinances, laws, and regulations.11 
What is striking about city power is how constrained it actually is.  In 
1967, political scientist Robert Dahl observed that “[c]ity-building is one of 
the most obvious incapacities of Americans.”12  Little has changed over the 
last fifty years, as suburbanization, deindustrialization, and the shift of 
policy-making authority from cities to states and states to the federal 
government has continued apace.  Despite the urban resurgence of the last 
decades and the increased prominence of municipal lawmaking, the city’s 
political economy remains the same.  Cities in the U.S. federal system 
continue to be limited in important ways.  The city’s exercise of authority, 
political influence, and economic power is incidental to, or parasitic on, the 
exercise of power by the private sector or higher-level governments. 
This Article describes the current political economy of city power and 
efforts to reform and remake it.  U.S. cities are resurging in many cases and 
their economic power sometimes generates policymaking power.  But the 
two examples noted—state takeovers of distressed cities and state 
preemption of municipal law—strikingly illustrate the significant distance 
                                                                                                                                         
bathroom-use-by-birth-gender.html [https://perma.cc/69JW-DUKX]. See also Richard 
Schragger, North Carolina’s “Bathroom Bill” and the Right to Local Self-Government, 
BALKINIZATION BLOG (Mar. 25, 2016), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/03/north-carolinas-
bathroom-bill-and-right.html [https://perma.cc/YZT2-YA5U]. 
 9. An Act to Provide for Single-Sex Multiple Occupancy Bathroom and Changing 
Facilities, N.C.G.S. § 143-422.2 (2016). 
 10. For a description of LBGT anti-discrimination ordinances see generally, Alan 
Greenblatt, Beyond North Carolina’s LGBT Battle: States’ War on Cities, GOVERNING (Mar. 
25, 2016), http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-states-cities-preemption-laws.html 
[https://perma.cc/5BHJ-JWC8]; Cities and Counties with Non-Discrimination Ordinances 
that Include Gender Identity, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/cities-
and-counties-with-non-discrimination-ordinances-that-include-gender 
[https://perma.cc/2KTL-FM8L].  For a description of living wage laws see Heidi Swarts & 
Ion Bogdan Vasi, Which U.S. Cities Adopt Living Wage Ordinances? Predictors of Adoption 
of a New Labor Tactic 1994–2006, 47 URB. AFF. REV. 743, 743–44 (2011). 
 11. Greenblatt, supra note 10. 
 12. Robert A. Dahl, The City in the Future of Democracy, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 953, 964 
(1967). 
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between municipal policy efforts and the city’s actual political and economic 
clout.  U.S. cities can do little without support from state authorities, which 
often block them from adopting preferred local legislation, fail to come to 
their aid when they are struggling, and take them over with relative impunity 
when they fail.13 
Part I describes two significant features of the U.S. political economy that 
account for the city’s weakness in relation both to markets and the 
centralizing state.  The first is the practice of treating cities as competitors in 
a global marketplace for capital and labor, which requires cities to “compete” 
for investment.  The second is the practice of state-based federalism, which 
increases the number of political competitors who seek to influence or 
control city policy-making. 
Part II considers past efforts to address these weaknesses through three 
institutional reforms: home rule, national urban policy, and regionalism.  
Home rule efforts in the mid-to-late-nineteenth century sought to address the 
attractiveness of cities to state legislators eager to exploit the political and 
financial opportunities of the urban population boom.14  Home rule gave 
municipalities some modicum of self-government, but it did not aid those 
cities that would experience industrial decline many decades later.  In the 
more recent past, national urban policy and regionalism have been offered 
as strategies to buttress cities in decline and provide more financial support 
for cities in the face of suburban growth.15  Those efforts have also been for 
the most part ineffective in providing urban financial stability for a 
significant number of municipalities. 
Part III considers more ambitious (and to this point, mostly theoretical) 
efforts to challenge the city’s basic lack of economic and political power.  A 
range of advocates and theorists have argued that city powerlessness is a 
deep feature of the global market economy.  Critical theorists argue that the 
city’s lack of power is a core component of a particular kind of liberal 
economic order—one that privileges rights of property over rights of self-
governance—and that the answer to city weakness is to challenge that 
prioritization.16 
These disparate challenges to the liberal market order have failed to 
coalesce and seem unlikely to do so anytime soon.  Nevertheless, Part IV 
                                                                                                                                         
 13. See, e.g., Davey & Walsh supra note 3; Philipps supra note 8. 
 14. See infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra note 86. See generally infra Parts II.B and II.C. 
 16. See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT 
BUILDING WALLS (Princeton Univ. Press, eds., 1999). See generally, CITIES FOR PEOPLE NOT 
FOR PROFIT: CRITICAL URBAN THEORY AND THE RIGHT TO THE CITY (Neil Brenner, et al. eds., 
2012); David Imbroscio, Urban Policy as Meritocracy: A Critique, 38 J. URB. AFF. 79 (2015); 
Kenneth A. Stahl, Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization, 2016 BYU L. REV. 177 
(2016). 
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suggests how the recent urban resurgence offers an opportunity to open-up 
some political and economic space for the exercise of city power, short of a 
radical transformation of the existing economic order.  What is necessary is 
a political movement, not necessarily a political revolution. 
This Article does not make a sustained argument on behalf of that 
movement.17  Instead, it describes the reasons for the city’s economic and 
political weakness and a set of institutional and academic responses to that 
weakness.  The reader does not need to agree that city power is ultimately 
desirable. 
That being said, this Article suggests here and in conclusion that city 
power can serve as an antidote to a growing global democracy deficit.  
Neither the nation-state nor the transnational corporation seem able to 
address the political alienation and economic instability felt by many citizens 
in the U.S. and elsewhere.  This felt instability has given rise to both left- 
and right-wing populism, often tainted by xenophobia and nationalism.18  In 
the United States, Donald Trump’s presidential victory is illustrative of the 
latter.  His rise to power is consistent with the British vote to exit the 
European Union and the increasing success of reactionary parties on the 
continent.19 
There are many sources of citizen dissatisfaction with conventional 
politics at the turn of the twenty-first century—immigration, terrorism, 
outright racism, and economic stagnation all contribute.  But surely another 
factor is the failure of national elites and distant government bureaucracies 
to provide effective responses to the economic and social dislocations caused 
by the global market economy.  For those who see the city as the best chance 
for a robust local participatory politics, who celebrate the city as holding 
out—in Dahl’s words—the “promise for the good life lived jointly with 
fellow citizens,”20 challenging the basis of city weakness is a central task.  If 
it can be fostered and protected, city power is one possible answer to 
increasingly potent economic and political estrangement. 
                                                                                                                                         
 17. For such an argument, see RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE 
IN A GLOBAL AGE (Oxford Univ. Press eds., 2016) (hereinafter CITY POWER). 
 18. See generally, Robert Kuttner, Sanders, Trump, and Economic Populism, AM. 
PROSPECT (Jan. 12, 2016), http://prospect.org/article/sanders-trump-and-economic-populism 
[https://perma.cc/A8K3-9CGR]; Jeff Stein, Trump, Brexit and the Rise of Europe’s Far-Right 
Stoke Fear in Brussels, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 3, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/trump-brexit-
europe-far-right-fear-brussels-527980 [https://perma.cc/Y9ZW-VLZD]. 
 19. See generally, Steven Erlanger, Brexit Proved to be Sign of Things to Come in US, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/world/europe/for-us-
brexit-was-a-sign-of-things-to-come.html [https://perma.cc/2PNT-SH4P]. 
 20. Dahl, supra note 12, at 964. 
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I.  WEAK CITIES 
Two features of the U.S. political economy define and limit city power.  
The first is the ideology and practice of market primacy—the idea that most 
goods and services should be produced through (free) markets and that state 
power should generally be limited to preventing, or solving, market failures.  
The second is state-based federalism, which interposes a regional tier of 
government in the U.S. between the nation and its cities.  Market primacy 
shifts power toward the private sector, while state-based federalism drives 
policymaking toward central governments. 
A. Market-Based Local Government 
Two aspects of the ideology of market primacy influence city power.  
First, the city is understood to be dependent on private investment for its 
economic health and welfare.  Second, the city is understood to be engaged 
in a competition for private investment with other locations.  Local officials, 
citizens, and interest groups all believe and act on these understandings.  The 
municipal politics that results tends to be development-favoring.  Local 
politics and policy are generally premised on the view that the exercise of 
city power is possible only to the extent that city officials can make alliances 
with those private-side economic actors who exercise real power.21 
Market-based local government is animated by a kernel of economic truth: 
that labor and capital are generally mobile and cities and other local 
governments are stuck in place.  From this observation, urban scholars and 
policymakers have generally embraced the idea—made famous by Paul 
Peterson’s concept of “city limits”22—that the range of plausible city policies 
are those that can be shown to enhance the community’s economic 
prosperity.  Prosperity depends on private sector success.  City policies are 
thus limited to those that attract and retain capital and labor in a competitive 
inter-jurisdictional environment.  Pursuant to this view, what ultimately 
governs the city are the financial, labor, and land markets, which place 
stringent limits on the city’s ability to act autonomously.  Market-based local 
government drives policymaking toward accommodating the private sector, 
namely capital and labor, which cities must attract and retain to remain 
economically vibrant. 
The theoretical and policy program that follows from this view of city 
competition has three salient features.  First, the competitive paradigm 
strongly suggests that social welfare redistribution or regulation is not an 
                                                                                                                                         
 21. See CLARENCE N. STONE, REGIME POLITICS: GOVERNING ATLANTA, 1946-1988, 233 
(Univ. Press of Kan. eds., 1989) (noting that the “elite controls resources of the kind and in 
the amount able to enhance the regime’s capacity to govern”). 
 22. See generally, PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS (Univ. of Chi. Press eds., 1981). 
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appropriate task for sub-federal governments and certainly not appropriate 
for cities.23  The city cannot risk capital flight by taxing it.  If firms and 
residents are overtaxed they will flee.  More importantly, if the city engages 
in redistributions that do not directly contribute to economic growth, the city 
will attract more needy poor people than it can support, further increasing 
the costs to the city and exacerbating capital flight. 24   On this theory, 
metropolitan-area tax-base competition means that cities can only 
realistically undertake developmental spending.25 
Second, the competitive paradigm predicts that cities will invariably 
converge on similar development and business-friendly policies.26  Any city 
that resists will be abandoned by core industries, small businesses, and 
talented labor pools.  “Business-friendly” policies might include subsidizing 
in-locality businesses, providing tax incentives for development, reducing 
regulation to a minimum, and generally keeping taxes low.27  They could 
also mean providing amenities that are desired by higher-income residents 
and educated or talented workers in particular industries.  In other words, 
cities have no choice but to adopt an attraction and retention strategy aimed 
at the most mobile taxpayers.  And though cities can adopt slightly different 
strategies, in the end they will be mostly doing the same things.  On this 
view, political ideology therefore plays a relatively small role in the running 
of cities.28 
                                                                                                                                         
 23. See id. 
 24. See WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM, 131–40 (Edward Elgar Pub. eds., 1972); 
PETERSON, supra note 22, at 182–83; PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 27–28 
(The Twentieth Century Fund 1995); Richard A. Musgrave, Fiscal Federalism, in JAMES M. 
BUCHANAN & RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC CHOICE: TWO 
CONTRASTING VISIONS OF THE STATE, 160–61 (Mass. Inst. of Tech. eds., 2000). But see 
Timothy J. Goodspeed, A Re-Examination of the Use of Ability to Pay Taxes by Local 
Governments, 38 J. PUB. ECON. 319, 320 (1989). 
 25. See PETERSON, supra note 22. 
 26.  See id. 
 27. Cities should “avoid redistributive policies that target the rich and drive them away.” 
Edward L. Glaeser, The Death and Life of Cities, in MAKING CITIES WORK: PROSPECTS AND 
POLICIES FOR URBAN AMERICA 22, 59 (Robert P. Inman ed., 2009).  Similarly, cities should 
avoid overregulating business and should “be responsive to the needs of developers and 
entrepreneurs.” Robert P. Inman, City Prospects, City Policies, in MAKING CITIES WORK: 
PROSPECTS AND POLICIES FOR URBAN AMERICA 1, 17.  City mayors should “fashion a pro-
growth coalition.” Id. at 18.  One way to do this is to “provide the amenities that will attract 
smart people and then get out of their way.” Glaeser, The Death and Life of Cities, in MAKING 
CITIES WORK: PROSPECTS AND POLICIES FOR URBAN AMERICA, at 59.  Finally, declining cities 
are disposable assets, so “[i]n many cases, people are best served by leaving areas that have 
passed their period of economic prominence.” Id. at 61. 
 28. PETERSON, supra note 22, at 115 (claiming that the issues faced by local governments 
are by their nature non-ideological and hence do not give rise to party politics); Elisabeth R. 
Gerber & Daniel J. Hopkins, When Mayors Matter: Estimating the Impact of Mayoral 
Partisanship on City Policy, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 326 (2011) (finding that spending areas and 
city revenue streams, over which cities have only limited discretion, show no strong partisan 
98 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV 
Third, market-based local government celebrates the theoretical benefits 
that will result from inter-city competition.  Poorly run cities will pay for 
their misdeeds by capital and labor flight, and well run cities will gain, as 
migrants flock there.  According to proponents of the market-based view, 
government will be made better by the discipline imposed by the threat of 
capital flight and by cities’ attentiveness to voter preferences.29 
Moreover, this attention will bring economic growth.30  Implicit in the 
market-based account is the notion that as long as cities adopt the right 
policies, they will increase their market share.  If they adopt the wrong 
policies, they will reduce it.  Cities are thus at fault when they decline and 
can be credited with good decisions when they boom.  Growth is highly 
susceptible to local policy choices.  But those choices have to be market-
friendly and are dictated by the vicissitudes of mobile labor and capital. 
The ideology and practice of market-based local government thus 
parallels the ideology and practice of market primacy generally.  The claim 
is that one can enhance social welfare by structuring government on the 
model of a competitive marketplace.31  In the theoretical local-government 
market, capital calls the tune and cities sing it.  The belief that cities are 
limited in their policy choices because real power resides in labor and capital 
markets is almost canonical. 
B. State-Based Federalism 
Market primacy is reinforced by the form that federalism takes in the 
United States.  U.S. state-based federalism privileges states over other forms 
of sub-national government as a constitutional matter.  Yet local 
governments are charged with significant responsibilities, even as they often 
lack the resources to meet them.  States exercise significant power over their 
political subdivisions, but state officials need not take responsibility for local 
economic conditions.  From the perspective of the city, this is the worst 
                                                                                                                                         
influence). But see Michael Craw, Overcoming City Limits, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. 361 (2006) 
(describing and contesting this view). See also Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, 
Representation in Municipal Government, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 605 (2014). 
 29. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES 
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 58 
(2001); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418–
23 (1956). See also Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-
Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 1, 5 (1995) 
(noting that the mobility of capital gives rise to a diverse array of public goods packages); 
OATES, supra note 24, at 49–50. 
 30. See Weingast, supra note 29.  The “growth machine” describes the political sociology 
of a development-centered urban politics. Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: 
Toward a Political Economy of Place, 82 AM. J. SOC. 309 (1976). See generally JOHN R. 
LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE 
(1987). 
 31. See Weingast, supra note 29. 
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possible state of affairs.  State-based federalism multiplies city officials’ 
political competitors while the formal distinction between federal, state, and 
local authority allows those competitors to pick and choose when to 
intervene. 
This state of affairs is a function of the mixed status of local governments 
in the United States.  Pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, states exercise 
plenary power over their local government jurisdictions.  For purposes of 
federal constitutional law, cities are generally treated as convenient agencies 
of their states.32  A city cannot assert a constitutional claim to exercise any 
particular powers, to adopt its own form of government, or to exist at all.33  
Nevertheless, under state constitutions, cities often enjoy a fairly high degree 
of formal autonomy, and as a matter of practice, cities exercise a fair amount 
of independent authority over their local economies and taxing and spending 
decisions.34  In comparison to other constitutional systems, the American 
federal system is decentralized as a formal matter.35 
Three features of that system contribute to city weakness.  The first is a 
mismatch between regulatory demands and regulatory scale.  Cities are 
charged with fostering a positive local economic climate, promoting 
employment, and providing for the health and welfare of local citizens.  But 
cities are not remotely autonomous.  A city’s fiscal status and economic 
health are deeply affected by global financial, labor, and goods markets.  
State and national tax, redistribution, immigration, land use, labor, and 
industrial policies all impact cities significantly.  Yet because the provision 
of basic municipal services is understood to be a local responsibility, the 
variations in that provision normally do not concern the state. 
Second, the formal separation of powers permits state officials to pick and 
choose when to intervene in local affairs without ever taking direct 
responsibility for local conditions.  States are quick to override local 
decisions with which they disagree but slow to take on responsibility for 
providing basic municipal goods. 36   Cities thus may have significant 
                                                                                                                                         
 32. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907). 
 33. See id. at 179. 
 34. See generally COMPARING LOCAL GOVERNANCE: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS (Bas 
Denters & Lawrence E. Rose eds., 2005) (comparing local autonomy across countries). 
 35. See id. 
 36. This result is a predictable outcome of a three-tiered federal system dominated by 
regional governments.  Though some commentators have suggested that state-based 
federalism enhances city power, see Roderick M. Hills Jr., Is Federalism Good for Localism? 
The Localist Case for Federal Regimes, 21 J. L. & POL. 187, 215 (2005), the opposite appears 
to be true.  As Frank Cross has argued, formally federal states may be more centralized than 
formally unitary ones. See Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 
(2002).  This is particularly due to the fact that larger organizations are more likely to be 
decentralized than smaller ones.  We might expect a large, unitary state to devolve significant 
decision-making powers to smaller-scaled entities, many of them smaller than American 
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responsibilities but insufficient resources to meet them.  At the same time, 
cities exercise little influence over state and national demands.  Because of 
the existence of three formally separate bureaucracies, state and federal 
authorities rarely need the direct cooperation or assistance of local officials 
to achieve state or national aims.  This formal independence reduces the 
city’s capacity to influence policies coming from the center.37 
Finally, third, the existence of a regional tier of government—the states—
exacerbates the vertical competition between elected officials.38  City leaders 
do not enjoy a monopoly on local representation.  Aside from other city 
officials, elected state and federal officeholders also represent local 
constituents.  The political competition that results involves taking credit for 
popular policies and avoiding blame for unpopular ones.  State-level “tax-
relief” and other types of unfunded mandates are an example. 
The gap between state-wide preferences and local ones can be large.  In 
North Carolina, for example, the “bathroom bill” pitted a politically 
conservative legislature representing exurban and rural interests against 
politically progressive mayors representing more liberal urbanites. 39  
Consider also New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio’s policy disputes with 
the governor of New York State, Andrew Cuomo.  Despite their shared 
party-affiliation (both are Democrats), Cuomo opposed de Blasio’s plan to 
tax high-income earners in the city to fund universal, city-wide pre-K 
programs.40  Cuomo also initially objected to a city-wide minimum wage 
increase and to de Blasio’s efforts to limit the expansion of charter schools.41  
Eventually, Cuomo agreed to fund a pre-K program, but rejected de Blasio’s 
proposed tax.  Cuomo also adopted his own minimum wage proposal (which 
                                                                                                                                         
states.  Moreover, a middle, regional tier of government is likely to take up the policy and 
fiscal space that would otherwise be occupied by local governments in a unitary system.  A 
middle tier of government will reduce the political power of more local officials. See id. 
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the state legislature eventually adopted) and rejected de Blasio’s charter 
school reforms.42 
For city leaders, the gap between formal authority and political influence 
is where much relevant policy is made.43  Very few of de Blasio’s significant 
plans could be achieved without the governor’s (and ultimately the state 
legislature’s) support.44 
For cities in fiscal crisis, that support has not recently been forthcoming.  
Detroit, Flint, and other rustbelt cities have been declining for at least fifty 
years.45  But their inability to garner sufficient state and national aid reflects 
an underlying reality: cities qua cities in the U.S. have few political allies 
and exercise limited political influence, either in statehouses or in 
Congress.46 
That was not always the case.  The New Deal coalition relied on urban 
ethnics and African Americans, which made city mayors powerful political 
brokers.47  Even as the city declined, New Haven’s mayor Richard Lee was 
able to garner significant federal funds in the 1950s and 60s era of urban 
redevelopment.48  As suburbanization took hold in the second half of the 
twentieth century, however, power shifted out of cities and continues to do 
so.49  White flight resulted in majority-black cities with metropolitan areas 
becoming more economically and ideological segmented. 50   The gulf 
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between Democratic cities and Republican exurbs continues to widen, aided 
by highly sophisticated political gerrymandering.51  This political landscape 
makes state legislatures even less likely to be responsive to urban 
constituencies. 
II.  EFFORTS TO ENHANCE CITY POWER 
The two sources of city weakness—market-based local government and 
the structure of U.S. state-based federalism—reinforce each other.  Market-
based theories of local government insist that cities cannot and should not 
adopt certain policies—like social welfare redistribution—without harming 
their economies.  At the same time, cities are encouraged to engage in inter-
municipal competition for capital on the theory that competition will both 
discipline cities to provide efficient services and encourage overall economic 
growth. 
Meanwhile, state-based federalism creates the political conditions under 
which state officials are likely to engage in selective localism: picking and 
choosing what local policies to override, while avoiding responsibility for 
underlying economic conditions.  Market-based local government informs 
decisions made through selective localism.  If private sector economic 
growth is or should be the city’s chief goal, then state intervention should be 
geared toward enhancing city competitiveness, not improving citizen well-
being through other means. 
State resistance to lending economic aid to struggling cities is an example.  
States have been loath to bail-out their declining cities on the theory that 
doing so will merely encourage the inefficiencies that led to failure in the 
first place. 52   Opponents of bailouts argue that back-stopping local 
economies will short-circuit the beneficial inter-municipal competition that 
generates efficient local government.53  States seem willing to intervene to 
assist struggling cities only when the state’s credit rating appears to be at 
risk, and then mostly in order to get the city back in the business of promoting 
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business.54  The end result is that cities do not receive help when they are 
failing, but invite interference when they are succeeding. 
The history of local government law in the U.S. illustrates both the 
dominance of the market as an organizing principle and the opportunism of 
selective localism.  A long-running trope of American municipal 
government is that city power is consistently vulnerable to manipulation by 
both private sector actors and state and national officials.55  Institutional 
reformers and urban policymakers have sought to address this problem—to 
create strategies that limit the political pathologies of inter-governmental 
relations while giving cities the capacity to pursue the material well-being of 
their citizens.  This Part describes three such approaches: home rule, national 
urban policy, and regional government.  All three reforms have sought to 
address the city’s economic and political dependence.  All have had little 
success. 
A. Home Rule 
Home rule has generally been the formal solution to the problem of the 
city’s lack of legislative autonomy.  Home rule grants in state constitutions 
or in state statutes are written to permit cities to adopt legislation in the 
absence of specific state authorization.56  Home rule grants can also provide 
a defense against preemptive state statutes, though these grants of home rule 
“immunity” are less common.57  The promise of home rule is that it will free 
cities from state constraints and state officials’ intermeddling.  The history 
of home rule, however, complicates this picture.  Home rule reformers were 
historically ambivalent about city power—as David Barron has shown58—
and home rule grants have often reinforced city limits instead of overcoming 
them. 
The history is important, for it shows that home rule was part of a package 
of Progressive Era state constitutional innovations meant to clean up state 
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politics.59  In an era of tremendous urban growth, massive wealth was being 
generated in the cities, and “the large rewards which lay in cities’ offices, 
their contracts, and the franchises in their streets became the mark of the 
political spoilsman in the state legislature.”60  In part, home rule grants were 
intended to prevent the exploitation of the city by state officials and the 
special interests that sought to take advantage of an expanding urban 
populace.  Inter-municipal competition to build infrastructure in the 
nineteenth century led to dubious giveaways to vested interests and 
contributed to state and local bond defaults during economic downturns.  
Reformers believed that keeping state government out of the affairs of 
municipal government would stem state-wide corruption.61 
The institutional solution to this grasping of city-generated wealth was 
multi-pronged, and only partially aimed to protect city decision-making.  
Indeed, reformers targeted avaricious legislators whether they were in 
statehouses or on city councils. 62   State constitutional reform involved 
restricting state legislative interference in municipal affairs, but it also 
involved restricting the ability for cities to favor private economic interests 
in other ways. 63   Public purpose requirements were added to state 
constitutions and were meant to limit the state and municipal governments’ 
authority to use public monies for private projects.64  State constitutional 
debt limitations prevented state and municipal governments from taking on 
debt.65 
The turn of the century also witnessed the rise of state boards of health, 
water, sewage, and schools—the beginnings of state administrative law.66  
State utility commissions were adopted in response to the corrupt awarding 
of municipal contracts for gas, electric, streetcar, and telephone services.67  
Meanwhile, city charter reforms transferred important local government 
functions to nonpolitical professional city managers.68  These reforms were 
of a piece with the Progressive Era emphasis on technical and expert 
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administration. 69   Home rule was not in the main a “local autonomy” 
strategy, but a “good government” strategy.  State constitutional reforms 
often limited cities as much as they empowered them. 
Importantly, that is how home rule continues to function, in three ways.  
First, home rule grants rarely include immunity from state preemptive 
legislation.  In most cases, states are free to override local ordinances unless 
those ordinances have a very limited reach, such as those relating to the 
internal organization of municipal government.70 
Second, and similarly, home rule grants of initiative have generally been 
interpreted by state courts to apply only to those matters that are deemed to 
be “local” in nature.  Issues that have effects outside the city’s borders or 
impede uniformity throughout the state are considered to be matters of 
statewide concern, both ineligible for local regulation and subject to state 
override.71  State courts have generally erred on the side of state power—
understandably so, as most local regulations have some spillover effects.  
The local regulation of particular industries, employment relationships, or 
wage and hours laws are especially prone to be rejected as they are easily 
characterized as having detrimental effects on the statewide business climate 
or the statewide interest in reducing compliance costs.72  As is the case with 
any judicial effort to distinguish the local from the national, what is a matter 
of local or statewide concern seems often to be a function of the substantive 
policy preferences of the judge hearing the case. 
Third, home rule grants do not address the imbalance of power between 
cities and the market.  Home rule addresses the city-state relationship, but 
not the city-capital relationship.  Shifting the locus of authority from the state 
legislature to the city council does not change the fact that private economic 
interests still exercise outsized power in municipal politics. 
In other words, home rule grants do not free cities from the demand that 
they act as competitors in a global market for mobile capital.73  While local 
autonomy can prevent the worst excesses of state interference, it does not 
ultimately challenge the municipal politics of economic growth, with its 
emphasis on the governmental promotion of, participation in, and 
subsidization of private commercial enterprise.  Indeed, home rule reinforces 
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that politics, for it is generally interpreted—as already noted—not to apply 
to local commercial and financial regulations.74 
Thus, for cities that are prospering, home rule protects initiatives that 
serve the state’s interests—mostly those policies that are property-
protecting.  The New York State legislature’s resistance to New York City’s 
effort to impose a local millionaire tax is an example.75 
In contrast, for cities in economic decline, home rule provides a figment 
of legal autonomy without practical capacity.  The declining city in the local 
government market can do little with its legal autonomy except align with 
private-side business interests in an often vain attempt to generate economic 
development and stem the exodus of its tax base.76  Detroit exercised its 
power of eminent domain to entice General Motors to build an automobile 
plant in the city. 77   New London, Connecticut, similarly exercised its 
eminent domain power in an effort to encourage Pfizer to relocate there.78  
In both cases, the cities did not act out of economic strength, but rather out 
of economic weakness.79  And in both cases, after opening businesses there, 
the private corporate beneficiaries of the cities’ largesse ultimately relocated, 
abandoning each city when economic conditions did not improve.  Home 
rule does not equal city power.  Many times, what declining cities need is 
more state intervention to mute the inter-city competition for tax base, not 
less. 
As many observers have pointed out, local governments are generally 
permitted to adopt policies intended to attract and retain economic resources 
and prevent their redistribution.80   Home rule as exercised by suburban 
municipalities makes it very difficult for states to impose inter-local revenue-
sharing, to override exclusionary land-use policies, or to promote state-wide 
fair housing.81  Suburbs use land use laws to limit low-income housing and 
preserve the local tax base.82  Suburban home rule limits cities’ capacity to 
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prevent flight as it preserves the suburbs’ capacity to avoid responsibility for 
the regional poor. 
In sum, as Kenneth Stahl has argued, “home-rule doctrine . . . suits the 
agenda of both the state and capital.”83  Home rule does not protect the city 
when it seeks to adopt legislation that contradicts the state’s basic 
commitments, especially the commitment to economic development.  For 
cities in economic decline, home rule provides no real answer to the forces 
of global disinvestment.  For prosperous cities and suburbs, home rule allows 
for business-friendly or property-protecting local policies but is often 
interpreted to reject local redistributive regulations.  Home rule tends to 
empower those jurisdictions in the metropolitan region that already enjoy 
economic and political power.  And it does nothing to reduce the city’s 
dependence on private economic investment or mute the competitive 
scramble for economic resources. 
B. National Urban Policy 
Home rule was a Progressive Era response to the problems of state and 
local inter-governmental relations.  In the mid-twentieth century, national 
urban policy became the focus for city planners, anti-poverty advocates, 
mayors, and urban developers concerned about the decline of cities.   
National efforts to grapple with ethnic white and black ghettos began with 
the New Deal, and continued through the War on Poverty and into the 
remainder of the twentieth century.84  The federal government subsidized 
housing, transportation, schools, and other municipal infrastructure. 85  
Federal urban policy has been much less ambitious since the Reagan 
administration and the reduction in federal funds in the 1980s. 86  
Nevertheless, federal monies (or the lack thereof) are influential in shaping 
affordable housing, transportation, and education policy in U.S. metropolitan 
areas.87 
Federal aid to cities can be understood as a way to liberate them from both 
their market-based resource constraints and from interference by state 
officials.  Unfortunately, federal support for the rebuilding of cities, 
especially in the urban renewal period, exacerbated existing local market 
forces instead of challenging them.88  And while federal programs do have 
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the potential to free cities from state dependence, often these programs—for 
all their good intentions—reinforce the same metropolitan-area political 
dynamics that they were intended to avoid. 
Indeed, it is well-documented that federal housing, urban renewal, and 
transportation policies reinforced racial residential patterns, encouraged the 
flight from cities, and failed to stop urban decline.  Housing financing in the 
mid-twentieth century occurred along racial lines, deepening divisions in 
metropolitan areas instead of overcoming them.  African American 
neighborhoods were starved of financing, while white neighborhoods—
especially those outside the city—received significant government support.89  
The federal government dictated lending standards for federally-backed 
home loans, which favored new construction over renovation, single-family 
instead of multi-family home construction, and homogeneously white 
instead of mixed or African American neighborhoods. 90   Redlining—
denying loans in African American neighborhoods—was an explicit federal 
policy.91 
Public housing also reinforced existing housing patterns.  Federally-
funded public housing was purposely segregated, as federal officials bowed 
to local pressure to avoid mixing “inharmonious social groups.”92  In many 
cases, local opposition derailed public housing altogether.  The influx of 
federal highway funds, combined with federal financing of new homes, 
accelerated white flight to the suburbs.93  The lack of quality housing in the 
cities fostered even more flight.94 
Federal urban renewal funds sought to stem this flight.  But urban renewal 
efforts were also infected by racism and mostly resulted in disinvestment 
from poor neighborhoods.  Downtown redevelopment schemes used slum 
clearance and blight removal to replace poor minority residents and the 
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businesses that sustained them with higher-income residents and amenities 
intended to appeal to wealthy suburbanites.95  Alternatively, federal funds 
were used to build highways through existing low-income neighborhoods, 
often destroying them in the process.96 
More generally, cities systematically redirected capital away from poor 
neighborhoods to downtown business districts, where it was used to prop up 
ailing commercial rents or remove unwelcome populations.97  Most of these 
efforts were unsuccessful in stemming urban flight.  Nevertheless, 
neighborhoods on the periphery and minority city residents suffered 
mightily.  In the African American community, redevelopment was known 
derisively as “negro-removal.”98 
To be sure, federal money in itself is not bad and has the potential to 
restore economic stability.  In the 1930s, only the national government had 
the resources and wherewithal to bring the country out of the Great 
Depression.  Federal monies were used during the New Deal period to build 
housing, schools, parks, hospitals and other infrastructure that helped the 
urban working class move into the middle class.  The problem was and has 
been that national programs do not generally avoid capture by those interests 
that already exercise power in metropolitan regions: suburbanites and 
downtown business interests.  Even now, after the heyday of urban renewal, 
city rejuvenation efforts paid for with federal monies often disenfranchise 
and uproot the urban poor, while shifting monies to corporate interests.99 
Moreover, federal policy cannot easily undo the city/suburb divide, which 
has been entrenched through constitutional law.  In Milliken v. Bradley, 
decided in 1974, the Court held that school desegregation remedies had to 
stop at the city line.100  This decision ushered in an era of increasing school 
segregation in northern cities.101  With the Supreme Court’s blessing, whites 
simply had to cross into a neighboring jurisdiction to avoid court-ordered 
desegregation remedies.  Other Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s limited 
plaintiffs’ ability to bring fair housing challenges when suburban 
municipalities sought to derail lower or middle income housing 
developments.102 
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Present day federal housing policies have also had deleterious effects on 
cities.  The U.S. has pursued an aggressive homeownership policy since the 
New Deal, providing subsidies for homeownership through the federal 
mortgage-interest tax deduction and by financing home mortgages through 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  The emphasis on homeownership has not 
been accompanied by adequate oversight of lenders, however.  During the 
lead up to the sub-prime mortgage crisis that precipitated the 2008 
Recession, predatory lenders engaged in “reverse redlining,” targeting 
vulnerable (and usually African American) consumers for high-interest 
loans.103  The influx of credit was soon followed by an outflow of equity, as 
large numbers of lower-income buyers lost their homes when the housing 
bubble burst.104  Notably, a number of cities attempted to regulate lending 
standards in the lead-up to the sub-prime mortgage crisis, but state courts 
invalidated municipal predatory lending laws as inappropriate exercises of 
local power.105  Many cities are still trying to recover from the avalanche of 
foreclosures that followed the 2008 crash.106 
A national urban policy could support and strengthen declining urban 
neighborhoods and return power to cities.  Some of the policies adopted in 
the 1960s pointed in that direction, authorizing neighborhood groups to 
determine where federal monies would be spent.107  Today, however, federal 
aid to cities is limited.  Federal funds for public housing have almost 
completely dried-up.108  Federal transportation dollars are scarce and mostly 
seem to subsidize highway construction. 109   Federal education funds 
available through No Child Left Behind are paired with punitive policies that 
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result in the closing of “failing” urban schools and the shifting of monies to 
corporate-run, charter schools.110 
The national government has the resources to invest in American cities.  
It did so in the New Deal and thereafter, sometimes to good effect.  But 
federal urban policy has generally been unreliable, vulnerable to national 
political trends, and directed towards clearance and removal instead of 
rebuilding in place.  Federal intervention has not enhanced city power.  
Indeed, federal policies have in many cases hurt the cities that they were 
intended to help. 
C. Regionalism 
A third oft-proposed solution to the resource-constrained city is 
regionalism.  Proponents of regional government urge consolidation of city 
and suburban governments as a way to mute inter-local tax base competition.  
The regionalist starts with the correct observation that the city/suburb divide 
is a deep cause of metropolitan-area inequality.111  The fiscal need to provide 
good services at a low tax price means that every jurisdiction competes to 
attract regionally desirable residents and businesses while repelling those 
that are undesirable.  Cities have traditionally been at a disadvantage in this 
competition, as they have more difficulty controlling the socio-economic 
characteristics of their residents. 
The regional solution involves extending the boundaries of the city 
outward, so that it captures the tax base generated by suburban growth.  As 
David Rusk has repeatedly pointed out, “elastic cities”—those that can 
expand their boundaries by annexing neighboring land—do better on 
measures of inequality than do inelastic cities.112  If the tax base is moving 
outside of city lines, then moving those lines makes a great deal of sense.  A 
metro government can redistribute from rich to poor areas within the 
jurisdiction, capturing taxes from neighborhoods that would otherwise be 
outside of the city’s taxing reach.  A regional government gives the city 
access to resources that it would not otherwise have. 
Current-day metropolitanism emphasizes another component of 
regionalism: the economic benefits of regional cooperation.  Advocates 
argue that metropolitan areas are unified labor and consumer markets and 
that the lines between metro-area jurisdictions are wholly artificial.113  They 
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further argue that the economic health of suburbs is higher in regions with 
healthier cities, that residents and businesses choose among metropolitan 
areas when deciding where to locate, and that cooperating municipalities can 
better provide the kinds of regional amenities that residents and businesses 
seek.114 
The old regionalism and the new metropolitanism sound perfectly 
sensible.  But there are two significant drawbacks.  The first is that 
suburbanites do not seem convinced.  American localism is deeply 
entrenched and the idea of regional government has never been popular.  
Metro government is a rare beast—found only in a handful of places.115  
Creating a regional tier of government requires the cooperation of the state 
legislature and state legislators are unlikely to push for a policy that reduces 
the power of suburban jurisdictions and seemingly increases the power of 
metros.  State legislatures instead tend to be responsive to their suburban 
constituencies and are loath to create large-scale regional entities that can 
compete with them for political power. 
Moreover, it is not entirely clear that cities would welcome consolidation 
with inner-ring suburbs.  Suburban resource needs have increased over the 
last few decades, as suburban poverty has increased.116  Cities may not find 
it to their advantage to be aligned with declining, fiscally-strapped suburban 
municipalities. 
The second drawback is that there is no reason to believe that regionalism 
will result in significant shifts of political or economic resources to urban 
areas.  In assessing Louisville’s experiment with regional government, for 
example, Hank Savitch and Ronald Vogel concluded that “city-county 
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consolidation has enhanced the ability of affluent suburbanites while 
reducing the political influence of blue-collar, inner-city residents, 
particularly African American residents.”117  They further concluded that 
city-county consolidation is likely to result in a “more internally cohesive 
[corporate] regime, coupled to weakened city neighborhoods that are less 
able to influence the development agenda” and “more rather than less urban 
sprawl.”118 
It is highly plausible that a newly combined county-city government 
would be dominated by suburban rather than urban interests.  Regionalists 
focus on the resources that will become available to the city once it 
consolidates with the county.  But political power tends to follow economic 
power and there is no reason to believe that county residents will readily give 
up their economic power. 119   Savitch and Vogel noted that after the 
Louisville consolidation, it became more expensive to mount a mayoral 
campaign for the combined city-county region and that business and 
suburban interests dominated the local political process.120 
Regionalism is a mobility strategy.  The regionalist accepts the basic 
premise of market-based government: that cities are unable to generate 
economic growth without attracting and retaining mobile factors.  As 
Douglas Rae has argued, “Those of us who want better life chances for low 
earning households in major cities, should set out to increase inequality by 
attracting and keeping high earners, now greatly underrepresented in central 
city populations.”121  The capture and tax agenda argues either for providing 
amenities to the rich to encourage them to relocate, or for enlarging the city’s 
boundaries—which serves the same purpose.  Another element of the capture 
and tax agenda is to disperse existing poor urban populations more evenly 
throughout the region.  Dispersal can take a number of forms: moving poor 
people into mixed income housing in the suburbs, limiting the building of 
low and moderate income housing in the urban core, or mandating that all 
municipalities take their “fair share” of the regional poor.122 
These policies seek to alter the demographics of city and suburb—a form 
of residential engineering that often faces resistance from both white 
suburbanites and minority urbanites.  Attracting the rich requires cities to 
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provide amenity-based “bribes” aimed at mobile taxpayers: arts districts, 
restaurants, museums.  For existing residents, projects that are aimed at 
increasing a neighborhood’s desirability to a certain demographic look like 
an exercise in gentrification.  At the same time, moving the poor out of 
certain neighborhoods—deconcentrating poverty—requires a high level of 
coercion and often destabilizes those neighborhoods.123 
Regional revenue-sharing to provide necessary infrastructure certainly 
makes a great deal of sense, as do other regional policies that promote and 
encourage residential and educational desegregation.  But the policies that 
the new regional government will adopt are likely to emphasize business-
friendliness at the cost of significant redistribution. 
In sum, regionalism may provide more resources to cash-starved local 
governments and that is all to the good.  But regionalism does not alter the 
relative powers of cities and the market.  Even in a redrawn metro, the 
political economy of the region will likely remain unchanged.  Wherever the 
boundaries are drawn, urban areas in the city are likely to be at a distinct 
political and economic disadvantage.  And the city—even one with expanded 
boundaries—will remain constrained. 
III.  [RE]CONCEIVING THE CITY 
Home rule, national urban policy, and regionalism operate within the 
existing framework of the market economy and three-tiered federal system.  
These approaches to city power seek to increase the city’s access to resources 
and enable the city to use them while limiting central interference. 
This Part considers more radical reform proposals—ones that challenge 
both market primacy and the existing distribution of power.  Radical 
critiques of the existing market order treat the city as a central site for 
democratic participation and economic justice.  In these accounts, the city is 
not only a jurisdiction and a physical form, but a political concept—
providing a form of organization that can arguably address the democratic 
and economic deficits of the existing liberal democratic nation-state.  Critics 
of city weakness evoke Aristotle’s polis: the city as synonymous with the 
concept of political partnership or self-governance.  Proponents argue that 
city power is an essential mechanism for reforming the market structures that 
engender inequality and that limit citizens’ political and economic 
freedom.124 
This Part briefly summarizes three of these accounts: the critical legal city, 
the right to the city, and the solidarity economy.  Each account offers a 
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structural critique of the existing market-based, liberal economic order.  Each 
account also struggles with similar difficulties of implementation. 
A. The Critical Legal City 
Consider first the critical literature on the legal city, led by Gerald Frug’s 
work on the city as a legal concept. 125   Writing against a backdrop of 
Marxian challenges to rights-based liberalism, Frug argues that the city’s 
weakness is a function of a liberal ideology that suppresses alternative forms 
of collective power.  In the act of bifurcating the state and the individual—
the former exercising power and the latter exercising rights—classical 
liberalism undermined and ultimately rejected the city as an independent 
source of collective authority.126 
According to Frug, this story started with the medieval city and its status 
as an intermediate corporate entity, combining features of the state and the 
market.  It ended with the reification of a new distinction between private 
rights-holders and governments.  Though municipal and business 
corporations were originally undifferentiated, the business corporation was 
ultimately understood to be entitled to private rights—namely, the right of 
property.  The municipal corporation, by contrast, was reconceived as a 
threat to the exercise of private rights. 
This differentiation took place over the course of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, as the municipal corporation evolved from a 
territorially-based trading corporation designed to protect member 
merchants’ and tradesmen’s prerogatives, to a political jurisdiction charged 
with protecting and advancing the health, safety, and welfare of its 
populace.127  The medieval city, which enjoyed a certain amount of political 
independence from both the Crown and Church, was replaced with the 
municipal corporation.  And the municipal corporation became an 
administrative arm of the state. 
Scholars have offered a variety of explanations for this dramatic shift.  
Some argue that republican ideology played a role—the medieval and early 
colonial municipal corporation was vulnerable to the same political winds 
that produced the American Revolution.  The closed municipal 
corporation—like other hierarchical, aristocratic, and nondemocratic 
institutions—had to be brought under democratic control.  The new 
economic thinking of Adam Smith and the developing notion of free markets 
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also influenced the change, as did the far longer historical movement from 
status to contract and the rise of the liberal legal order.128  The shift away 
from collectivism toward individual autonomy, with its language of human 
rights, made it necessary to reconfigure institutions that were neither state 
nor individual.129 
Frug tells a more critical story, arguing that the demise of city power was 
a function of the rise of the centralizing state coupled with an emphasis on 
property rights over collective rights of self-government.130  Frug further 
argues that the emerging rights-based liberalism had no room for 
intermediate entities between the state and the individual, because those 
entities were too much of a threat to the power exercised by each.131  And so 
the city was assimilated to the state, while the private business corporation 
and other associational entities were assimilated to the individual.132 
As Frug points out, the municipal corporation’s economic power was the 
chief casualty of this bifurcation.133  Once the medieval and early-colonial 
city no longer maintained a monopoly on trade, vocations, and the selling 
and buying of goods, the city had to establish a new relationship with 
commercial activity in order to control the capital necessary to sustain it.134 
In the United States, the bulk of that work was done by classical jurists 
and reformers concerned about the relationship between legislatures and 
economic favoritism more broadly. 135   Classical late-nineteenth-century 
legal thinkers worried that legislatures were inclined to favor certain groups 
in the marketplace over others.   In the arena of municipal law, cities were 
actively engaged in what classical legal thinkers saw as economic 
favoritism—the distribution of exclusive franchises and monopolies and the 
use of public power to promote private gain.136  Therefore, these thinkers 
saw judicial oversight as necessary to ensure that legislation was in the public 
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interest.137  They also pushed for limits on municipal power as necessary to 
protect the fundamental right of all free persons to enter into markets or 
participate in avocations on an equal basis.138 
This legal invention of the disempowered city was essential to the creation 
of our existing capitalist, market-centered legal order, according to Frug.  
That legal order assumes the bifurcation of market and state and prevents 
each from entering the sphere of the other, making it seem the “natural” and 
“obvious” way to organize political and economic life. 
Critical legal theorists have long targeted that necessitarian logic.139  Frug 
draws on these critiques to reject the weak city, arguing that true democratic 
freedom requires empowering an intermediate association that is neither 
state nor market, but enjoys characteristics of both.  For Frug, city power 
would help dismantle a liberalism that favors capital over collectives and 
private corporate power over public democratic freedom.140 
Operationalizing such a profound revolution in our legal and economic 
sensibilities is difficult.  Frug admits that market-based liberalism is not 
going away anytime soon and that his vision of an empowered city is 
utopian.141  So he starts small, suggesting municipal ownership of productive 
assets such as banks and insurance companies.142  The municipal operation 
of commercial enterprises is a conceivable way to challenge the market/state 
distinction.  City ownership of the instruments of corporate finance can bring 
markets under popular democratic control—the goal of an empowered city 
strategy. 
How transformative this strategy can be is a real question.  But 
importantly, Frug conceptualizes city power as central to the project, not just 
incidental to some other set of policy goals.143  As he writes: 
We can transform society as much or as little as we want in order to begin 
the process of making the city an alternative form of decentralized power 
in our society.  We can accept all, part, or none of the market system and 
the welfare state.  But real power must be given to cities.144 
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In this way, Frug’s critical project is adamantly city-centered.  City power 
is not incidental to the project of recreating the existing economic and 
political order.  It is essential to that project’s success. 
B. The Right to the City 
The city as the locus of transformative reform is also at the heart of “the 
right to the city,” a concept developed by the pioneering French sociologist 
Henri Lefebvre in the late 1960s145 and recently revived by a diverse set of 
urban-based political movements.146  Those who invoke the right to the city 
assert an individual liberty to access urban resources, to avoid spatial 
segregation and exclusion, and to be provided with public services that meet 
basic needs in health, education, and welfare.147  The right to the city, as 
some have used it, is also an assertion of a fundamentally public right to 
certain territories and a resistance to the privatization of urban space.148  The 
right to the city has been invoked to challenge the exclusionary 
developmental processes that have shaped metropolitan areas worldwide.  
These include segregation, slum clearance, urban renewal, urban decline, 
and gentrification.149 
These types of claims have been mostly asserted by anti-poverty 
advocates in response to the rapid pace of global urbanization.  Dramatic 
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inequality in the mega-cities of the developing world has given rise to violent 
disputes over access to land, municipal services, and public space.150  The 
right to the city has also been linked to international protest movements like 
Occupy Wall Street that first appeared in developed countries.151 
Advocates use the language of rights to lay claim to the city as a social 
and political collective.  The idea of a claim on the city—a legal entitlement 
to it—is more than an affirmative social welfare right.  As influential Marxist 
urbanist David Harvey argues, the right to the city is “far more than a right 
of individual or group access to the resources that the city embodies . . . it is 
a collective rather than individual right.”152  It encompasses the idea that 
individuals have idiosyncratic, non-monetizable stakes in neighborhoods 
and in the city as a whole that should be recognized.  In other words, 
individuals have a right not just to the exchange value of land but to its use 
value as well—not just to buy and sell urban land, build or tear down 
buildings, or invest capital—but also to enjoy the city’s non-commodifiable, 
public goods of sociability, society, and community.  This entitlement can 
be operationalized as a right to stable tenure regardless of one’s resources. 
In addition, the right to the city suggests that individuals should have equal 
access to communal processes that create wealth, because the city is itself a 
product of those processes.  Harvey argues that “to claim a right to the 
city . . . is to claim some kind of shaping power over the processes of 
urbanization.”153  Edward Soja elaborates: 
Lefebvre saw the normal workings of everyday urban life as 
generating . . . inequitable and unjust distributions of social resources 
across the space of the city.  Demanding greater access to . . . valued 
resources by those most disadvantaged by inequitable and unjust 
geographies defined the struggle to reclaim the manifold rights to the city.  
The aim, at least from the liberal egalitarian point of view, is to gain greater 
control over the forces shaping urban space . . . to reclaim democracy from 
those who have been using it to maintain their advantaged positions.154 
Like Frug’s argument for city power, the right to the city is a claim to 
appropriate democratic control over the political and social processes that 
constitute urbanization.  Marxist theorists like Harvey invoke this idea by 
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challenging the existing capitalist order.155  But the right to the city can also 
be used in a more limited way to challenge existing political and social 
arrangements that exclude or marginalize, namely those development 
processes that favor the wealthy over the poor. 
The right to the city has been difficult to realize, however, in large part 
because it is invoked across so many contexts.  In some ways it is a defensive 
right—a right not to be expropriated or displaced by predatory development 
policies.  It is also an affirmative right to gain from the wealth generated by 
the city.  The argument for “spatial justice”156 partakes of both of these ideas.  
Proponents argue that land-based private development constrains the 
public’s rights to the collective value of the city, and regularly isolates, 
excludes, and restricts particular groups or classes of individuals from 
asserting this right.157 
This spatial approach—embodied in “occupy-style” protests that assert 
literal and symbolic territorial claims—is utterly foreign to the current 
market-based orthodoxy.  Market-based local government assumes that a 
combination of property rights and (generally) free markets generate the 
patterns of metropolitan-area development that result.  On this view, the city 
is a neutral background against which individual property owners act—no 
more than a legal jurisdiction in which individuals who already hold rights 
exchange entitlements.  Urbanization and the wealth it produces are thus 
primarily a market process, not a political one. 
The right to the city asserts otherwise.  It challenges the politics of 
urbanization, not just its economics.  This politics favors transnational 
corporations over local communities, wealthy new arrivals over the existing 
poor, competition over solidarity, development over stable tenure.  At root, 
the right to the city is an anti-poverty movement, but it is also an assertion 
of a more egalitarian urban politics—a claim to the city as a place of 
collective ownership. 
C. The Solidarity Economy 
A similar dissatisfaction with the inequitable results of urban development 
is reflected in critiques of liberal urban policy.  Critics charge that current-
day anti-poverty policies have failed to address underlying structural 
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inequalities that are endemic to global capitalism and that the tax and 
redistribute program is insufficient to resolve those inequalities. 
David Imbroscio’s work is a recent example.  Imbroscio argues that the 
standard progressive reform agenda is inadequate to the task of solving the 
deep problems of urban poverty.158  That reform agenda, he contends, is 
characterized by a “meritocratic paradigm”—an approach to urban poverty 
that seeks to address barriers in the social environment that prevent the poor 
from reaching their full potential. 159   These efforts are geared toward 
providing individuals the resources to overcome the disadvantages of 
inadequate schooling, troubled families, and poverty-impacted 
neighborhoods.160  But, according to Imbroscio, these policies miss the point 
entirely: by focusing on equality of opportunity, liberals misidentify the 
source of urban poverty as inadequate social services or weak social ties, 
when the origins of economic inequality run much deeper.161  Imbroscio 
agrees that resources are inequitably distributed, but he disagrees that the 
goal of liberal policy should be to afford individuals in poor places the ability 
to achieve upward mobility by “dint of their own merit.”162  American urban 
policy should instead be geared toward restructuring an economy that 
produces a few “merit-worthy” winners and a large number of losers.163 
Imbroscio makes two claims.  The first claim is that liberal policymakers 
are too enamored of a set of “uplift” policies that have not been proven to 
work. 164   The second claim is that these policies are targeted toward 
individual mobility and thus underappreciate the need for community-wide 
economic strategies that can address structural economic disparities.165  He 
contends that current policies geared toward increasing individual 
opportunity are not going reverse the broad economic trends of the twentieth 
and early twenty-first centuries and to expect them to do so only reinforces 
existing inequalities. 
Education policy is Imbroscio’s first example.166  As he notes, school 
reform has been viewed as a solution to poor, stagnant urban economies for 
at least half a century and yet “we see over and over the inability of various 
reform efforts to achieve much achievement in poor children’s schooling.”167  
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In the current economy, even those who do attain a college education—and 
it is precious few—are not guaranteed success.  Imbroscio cites statistics 
showing that those who start below the poverty line tend to stay there, 
regardless of their educational attainments.168  And he cites further data that 
shows that people who start in the middle class and do attain college 
degrees—while doing better than those who do not—also fall out of the 
middle class in very high numbers.169 
Imbroscio also challenges the efficacy of programs that seek to correct for 
family and neighborhood dysfunction, arguing that these interventions only 
have modest effects on social mobility rates.170  Early childhood intervention 
policies, for example, do not seem to generate great gains in social mobility 
over time, even if they may help some individual students achieve greater 
success. 
The same is true of policies that seek to move people out of their existing 
neighborhoods or disperse poverty through the creation of mixed-income 
communities.  Imbroscio argues that such policies—like the “Moving to 
Opportunity” program that gives families vouchers to relocate to lower 
poverty neighborhoods—have shown at best mixed results. 171   He also 
observes that for most residents of poor neighborhoods, relocation is not 
desirable or even feasible.172  Mobility policies underappreciate the value 
and importance of human attachments to family, home, neighborhood, and 
community.173   But more importantly, such policies are impractical and 
inhumane to implement on a large scale.  Even moving relatively large 
numbers of families out of poor neighborhoods would have only slight 
effects on overall social mobility rates. 
In short, Imbroscio argues that addressing poverty by reducing 
opportunity barriers is simply not a viable long-term strategy.  Drawing on 
Thomas Piketty’s path-breaking work on inequality,174 Imbroscio observes 
that the widespread social mobility that characterized mid-century western 
nations seems to have passed.  As he writes: “the meritocratic dream at the 
heart of liberal urban policy seems doomed at least for the foreseeable 
future.”175  And so, “[r]ather than being designed to produce high rates of 
social mobility for meritorious individuals, the key aspiration [of social 
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welfare policy] must instead be the uplift of entire urban communities.”176  
Imbroscio calls this emphasis the “solidarity economy,” 177  which he 
distinguishes from a competitive economy that focuses on rewarding 
achievement. 
The solidarity economy strives to create local, stable economies in place.  
Instead of embarking on a “massive sociospatial reordering of the urban 
population,” 178  Imbroscio advocates “community-based development 
institutions, worker-owned firms, publicly-controlled businesses, and webs 
of interdependent (locally networked) entrepreneurial enterprises”—all of 
which will “generate indigenous, stable and balanced economic growth in 
local economies.”179  These efforts are directed toward struggling inner-city 
communities; the idea is not to relocate poor people to new neighborhoods, 
but to give them the resources to gain economic security where they are. 
Imbroscio advocates a populist localism.  The response to the dislocations 
caused by globalization is to reconstruct the economy on a local and less 
vulnerable scale.  The goal is to counter global corporate capitalism with 
community economic development and to provide for the city’s economic 
and civic independence from the strictures of global finance. 
As Imbroscio points out, this constructive form of economic populism is 
necessitated by the failure of the existing meritocratic regime to address 
economic stagnation.  The individual opportunity and mobility strategy is 
too weak to counter the forces of transnational capital mobility and accumul-
ation.  According to Imbroscio, the meritocratic paradigm has not only failed 
African American inner-city residents, but has also disappointed many 
downwardly mobile white middle-class Americans.  The rise of ethnic 
nationalism on the right and anti-corporate populism on the left is a 
symptom.180 
To be sure, cities are easily coopted by corporate forces.  Locals’ capacity 
to assert independence from global markets is questionable.  For that reason, 
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critics of liberal urban policy like Imbroscio often embrace municipal or 
local ownership of productive assets and institutions.  Indeed, the theme of 
public or municipal ownership runs through each of the critical accounts of 
the existing market economy.  Progressive-Era reformers also encouraged 
municipal ownership, as a similar demand for public control over the 
instruments of economic development informed that movement. 
IV.  CITY POWER 
Advocates of city power, the right to the city, and the solidarity economy 
are responding to the seeming dominance of global capital in the twenty-first 
century.  An abiding theme of these critiques of market-based liberalism is 
the lack of democratic control over the scope, scale, and terms of economic 
growth and decline.  Cities are the visible manifestations of this democracy 
deficit.  The hollowed-out shell of Detroit can be contrasted with the 
gleaming residential towers of Manhattan.  In both instances, global market 
processes have bypassed a significant portion of the populace.  Resistance to 
the market—whether it is disinvesting or overinvesting—seems futile.   
Theorists writing in a critical mode champion city power by way of 
reimagining certain basic liberal commitments.  Frug challenges the 
market/state distinction; Marxist theorists seek a revolutionary urban 
politics; economic localists reject the equal opportunity gospel.  In all these 
cases, however, the likelihood of a radical shift away from the current 
market-based orthodoxy seems remote. 
The urban resurgence of the last decades, however, suggests a way 
forward, as it teaches two lessons that undercut the assumptions of capital 
mobility and city subservience.  First, the urban resurgence calls into 
question the competitive model of urban growth and decline.  Cities do not 
“compete” themselves into urban success—the causes of city success or 
failure are complicated and not easily attributable to particular capital-
favoring policies.  If that is true, then we can reverse the assumption that 
capital calls the tune and that cities must sing it. 
Second, if we take that reversal seriously, it suggests that cities have the 
capacity to engage in social welfare redistribution and other policies that are 
not directly responsive to the demands of mobile capital.  It may also be 
possible for the city’s economic power to translate into political power, 
though that is less assured in light of the constraints of U.S. state-based 
federalism. 
A. A New Urban Economics 
The first step is to challenge the competitive account of city growth and 
decline.  Recall that the ideology and practice of market-based local 
government presumes that cities are in a global competition for mobile 
capital and that any given city’s success or failure will turn on its capacity to 
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attract and retain it.  But this competitive paradigm is theoretical.  The idea 
of the “limited city” might not be accurate if social welfare policies do not 
precipitate capital flight or if there is little or no connection between market-
friendly policies and economic growth. 
In fact, the reasons for city growth or decline are complex, and not often 
attributable to policy.  Standard explanations of urban development tend to 
emphasize technological or demographic change, not tax or expenditure 
policies.  For example, even well-governed cities declined in the face of 
deindustrialization during the middle part of the twentieth century.181 
More importantly, the urban rebound of the last twenty years does not 
appear to have been caused by any particular capital attraction and retention 
policies.  Urban resurgence is a global phenomenon.  Cities have become 
more prosperous whether or not local officials pursued neo-liberal market 
policies or did something else.  In the last twenty years, none of the U.S. 
cities that have now seen their populations stabilize and their property values 
increase moved to reduce local tax rates or regulations so substantially as to 
eliminate the city-suburb differential.182  Nor have those rebounding cities 
demonstrably improved particular city services.  Urban schools, for example, 
have not gotten measurably better when compared to their suburban 
counterparts.183  And whether a city is “business-friendly” or has low taxes 
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and low regulatory burdens does not predict growth,184 even if city boosters 
claim otherwise. 
Resurgent cities have, in fact, not done anything starkly different from 
what they had been doing for the past seventy-five years to attract young 
people and suburbanites to the urban core.  Massive investments in urban 
renewal, highway building, stadiums, and showplaces did not slow the 
decline of post-industrial cities in the middle and latter part of the twentieth 
century.  The relatively minor investments in cities at the turn of the twenty-
first century appear to be an unlikely cause for cities’ more recent successes. 
So what explains the urban resurgence?  The conventional market model 
assumes that capital is hyper-mobile and that cities must compete to attract 
it.  Because capital can flee, local governments have a limited range of policy 
options.  In particular, they have limited ability to adopt social welfare 
redistribution and regulations that appear hostile to corporate capital.  The 
urban resurgence, however, suggests that the relationship between capital 
and the city moves in the opposite direction.  One can flip the assumption 
about who is competing for what.  Instead of the city competing for capital, 
capital is competing for cities. 
This idea is not so strange.  Technology firms compete to be in San 
Francisco.  Finance firms compete to be in London.  Young, educated 
workers compete to be in Manhattan and so do corporate headquarters.  This 
competition is evident in the high rents that these residents and businesses 
are willing to pay.  As any realtor will tell you, “location, location, location.” 
In other words, the view that capital and labor are endlessly mobile is 
incorrect.185  The competitive theory of city growth and decline assumes a 
relatively flat world, in which jurisdictions compete on an even playing field.  
Economic geographers, however, have shown that this is not true. 186  
Economic activity is not spread evenly over geographic space.  Some places 
                                                                                                                                         
schools-behind [https://perma.cc/7NYH-3CFP] (discussing gentrification’s effect on public 
schools in Washington D.C.). 
 184. See SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 17 at 191-217. See also, Terry F. Buss, The 
Effect of State Tax Incentives on Economic Growth and Firm Location Decisions: An 
Overview of the Literature, 15 ECON. DEV. Q. 90, 97-99 (2001); Yoonsoo Lee, Geographical 
Redistribution of U.S. Manufacturing and the Role of State Development Policy, 64 J. URB. 
ECON. 436-47, 445 (2008); Carlos F. Liard-Muriente, U.S. and E.U. Experiences of Tax 
Incentives, 39 AREA 186, 189-90 (2007) (reviewing literature). 
 185. See MARIO POLÈSE, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF REGIONS: WHY CITIES MATTER 54-
55 (2009); WORLD BANK, 2009 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: RESHAPING ECONOMIC 
GEOGRAPHY 50-52 (2009); K.R. Cox, The Local and the Global in the New Urban Politics: 
A Critical View, 11 ENV’T & PLAN. D: SOC’Y & SPACE 433, 437-41 (1993). 
 186. See SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 17, at 34-40. 
2017] CITY POWER 127 
will always have more economic activity and some will have less.187  Often 
those with less will decline even when their costs are lower, while those with 
more will continue to advance despite their comparative cost disadvantage.  
Location matters to persons and firms—the flow of workers or businesses 
into or out of a particular jurisdiction is not simply a question of which 
jurisdiction has lower costs.  Economists have shown that dense, rich places 
often get denser and richer while sparse, poor places get less populated and 
poorer.188  Being in the right location appears to offer myriad economic 
advantages.189  Capital and labor need cities as much as cities need capital 
and labor. 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, cities have reasserted their 
historical advantages as providers of the infrastructure, markets, and labor 
pools that generate growth. 190   Cities seem to thrive in an economy 
increasingly dominated by knowledge-based industries—such as 
information technology—where informal face-to-face communication is 
understood as essential.  Cities are centers of innovation and appear to be 
necessary for the intra- and cross- industry exchange of ideas.  But cities also 
seem to be thriving simply because they are denser and contain more people, 
jobs, and opportunities for social, economic, and political interaction than do 
suburbs and exurban jurisdictions.191 
Market-based theories of local government need to attribute the success 
or failure of cities to some policy change.  If “competition” between cities is 
to mean anything, the city must exercise some level of agency—some 
capacity to control its economic fate.  But it is likely that city growth and 
decline is cyclical and only indirectly connected with any particular local tax 
and spend policy.  The processes by which twenty-first century cities have 
become larger and more important are not reducible to inter-city competition 
and cannot be attributed to any particular set of urban policies.  Competition 
does not induce growth—other forces are at work. 
Indeed, the inability to predict economic growth and decline should make 
scholars and policymakers wary of claims that capital-attracting policies are 
at play.  Recall that in 1950 many believed that Detroit would become the 
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biggest and most influential city in the United States.  In the early 1970s, 
prognosticators predicted New York City’s rapid and inevitable decline.192  
How any given city will experience the economic cycle is not easily 
predictable.  That fact should disabuse policymakers of the notion that if 
cities just adopted the right capital-favoring policies, all will be right. 
If growth and decline are much less susceptible to policy than 
conventional accounts assert, then cities are much less constrained to adopt 
capital-favoring policies in order to succeed.193  In the large number of cases, 
such policies will not do much good.194  And adopting contrary policies will 
not do much harm.  Rather than an observation of fact, the argument that 
cities are competing is an assertion used by certain political interests to 
advance their own aims, regardless of the effects of the particular policies 
that they support. 
B. A New Urban Politics 
The difficulty of predicting city growth or decline leads to the second 
lesson of the urban resurgence: the city’s assumed limits are less economic 
than political.  The proliferation of metropolitan-area local governments and 
the subsidization of suburban flight are not economic facts, but political 
ones.  Disinvestment from central cities in the mid-twentieth century was 
hastened by the federal support for suburban development, segregationist 
housing policies, and Supreme Court decisions that limited the reach of 
school desegregation.  That local government borders are porous and that 
local governments have to fund their services with what they earn in 
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jurisdictionally-local tax dollars is a function of political organization.195  
State officials’ “selective localism” is similarly a function of political 
organization.  The formal division of authority between local, state, and 
federal governments and the vertical competition between officials who 
represent “local” constituents are a product of U.S. state-based federalism.  
These aspects of state power are a political reality: the states are not going 
away anytime soon. 
But urbanization is a reality too.  And growing metropolitan regions are 
changing state-level political dynamics.  For example, cities and 
metropolitan areas in traditionally rural and southern states are generating a 
new political calculus as increasingly diverse, young, educated, and 
progressive voters migrate to urban places.196 
More importantly, accepting that growth can neither be hastened by 
“business-friendly” policies nor readily retarded by “redistributive” ones 
opens up a larger array of urban policy options.197  Cities have more freedom 
to pursue certain social welfare and anti-discrimination objectives.  These 
objectives expose the widening rift between urban political constituencies 
and rural or exurban ones.  Conflicts between cities and their states and 
between cities and the federal government are likely to increase, at least in 
the short term. 
The municipal living wage movement is a good example, both of cities’ 
political capacities and of states’ often hostile response.  According to the 
conventional account, local minimum wage laws are a bad idea.  Economists 
are suspicious of municipal wage floors, worrying that under such a law, 
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employers would reduce hiring or move out of the jurisdiction altogether.198  
Therefore, they argue that cities cannot regulate wages without generating 
capital flight.199  Only centralized governments can effectively adopt wage 
floors.200 
The recent living wage movement, however, has tested those claims.  
Cities were the first governments to adopt significant wage hikes, and those 
cities have not seen a massive outflow of capital and jobs.201  Evidence also 
shows that higher minimum wages reduce urban poverty.202  The success of 
municipal living wage laws has induced some states to adopt higher 
minimums and is putting pressure on federal elected officials to follow 
suit.203  What is now a national minimum wage movement had little political 
traction until cities adopted their own wage floors in the mid-2000s.  In 
addition, cities have become important sites for organizing low-wage 
workers in the healthcare, hospitality, and service industries 204  and for 
pursuing a whole range of worker-favorable policies. 
Of course, as previously noted, the city’s ability to adopt and protect its 
own laws is significantly limited.  Conservative state legislatures have 
aggressively preempted local wage, anti-discrimination, housing, and social 
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welfare laws adopted by more progressive-minded cities.205  Over twenty 
states have adopted laws preempting local minimum wage ordinances.206 
Indeed, the current political environment is quite hostile to cities.  City 
constituencies tend to be more politically progressive, but conservatives hold 
power in the majority of state houses and in the U.S. Congress, and more 
recently took over the American presidency.  Donald Trump has attacked so-
called “sanctuary cities”—cities that provide identification cards and other 
services for undocumented workers or that refuse to assist federal authorities 
in enforcing federal immigration laws.  He has threatened to cut their receipt 
of federal funds if they do not assist with federal immigration 
enforcement.207  A number of mayors have declared that they will resist, 
though the costs of such resistance could be significant.208  American cities 
do not now have an ally in the Oval Office, or in any of the branches of the 
federal government, and they have few allies in the states. 
Nevertheless, the periphery’s influence on the center shifts over time.  
Like economic cycles, political cycles are difficult to predict.  The centripetal 
forces of the twentieth century are still at work in the twenty-first.  But there 
are emergent counter-forces.  For critics of the existing market-based 
political order, city power may be able to serve as a counterweight both to 
global corporate capital and the increasingly distant nation-state.  As 
conservative attacks on liberal democracy reveal popular dissatisfaction with 
the status quo, locating an alternative and more accessible site for economic 
and political participation seems ever more urgent.  That site can (and for 
many, should) be the city.  The rise of urban-based political movements 
suggests that city power is a political possibility even as it faces significant 
opposition by those committed to state power in the service of global capital. 
CONCLUSION 
Cities operate in a market economy that privileges private economic 
interests and a constitutional structure that places cities at the bottom of a 
hierarchy of governments.  For most of the latter half of the twentieth 
century, American cities were decidedly subordinate to both mobile capital 
and to more central government officials, in both theory and in practice.  At 
the turn of the twenty-first century, there has been a subtle shift—central 
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cities have gained ground and economic activity is increasingly centered in 
metropolitan areas. 
To be sure, the U.S. political culture is still characterized by a fervent anti-
urbanism.209  Declining cities like Flint are taken over with little fanfare.  
Legislators preempt local legislation with a minimum of political pushback.  
In the nineteenth century, a political movement led to the adoption of home 
rule reforms.  In the twentieth, a political movement agitated for a national 
urban policy.  But these efforts did not protect or ensure city power—the 
hydraulic forces of centralization and privatization have simply been too 
strong.  Those forces are unlikely to abate soon. 
The American city’s weakness is not just a function of impersonal social 
and economic forces, however.  Its weakness is also a function of an ideology 
of American-style municipal boosterism that infects every aspect of the 
center-periphery relationship.  For the booster, cities are market actors and 
municipal citizens are shoppers in a market for location.  A city’s economic 
success is proof of a city’s good leadership.  Economic decline is proof of a 
city’s failure to innovate.  The American city continues to be defined by its 
commercial success—something it has little control over—as opposed to its 
fostering of a politics and economics of equals—something it in fact has 
some capacity to advance. 
Imaging a different city will take effort—both theoretical and practical.  
The goal of such a reimagining is a richer account of democratic life—one 
that can address a more profound political alienation.  Providing cities with 
home rule protections or with additional financial support can ameliorate 
some of the material challenges that cities face, but not this deeper political 
and economic malaise. 
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